As a commentary for the special section on Reconceptualizing the Classification of Mental Disorders, this article begins with a description of the impetus for the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health's (NIMH) Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative and provides an update of progress on that initiative to date. The commentary then engages the articles in this special section, beginning with a response to Berenbaum's concern that the RDoC approach to sorting constructs across multiple units of analysis espouses a de facto biological fundamentalism. This leads us to delineate the relationship between RDoC and the NIMH priorities relevant to this initiative. The commentary then considers how Patrick's iterative "construct-network" method can be applied to RDoC construct validation, highlighting several aspects that are particularly useful. One aspect of this work involves determining subject inclusion and exclusion criteria that provide an appropriate range of variance. Finally, this commentary considers the Bilder group's article, explicating the ways in which multilevel models can foster development of hypotheses and informatics approaches needed for further RDoC progress.
Impetus for the NIMH RDoC Initiative
In 2008, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) published its new strategic plan, which included the following aim: "Develop, for research purposes, new ways of classifying mental disorders based on dimensions of observable behavior and neurobiological measures" (http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/strategicplanning-reports/index.shtml#strategic-objective1). This aim was subsequently implemented as the Research Domain Criteria project, or RDoC (http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-funding/rdoc/ index.shtml).
The reasons that NIMH decided to pursue this new effort are familiar to any regular reader of this journal. Research in psychopathology has increasingly identified problems with the current diagnostic system, as embodied in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and the mental and behavioral disorders section of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD; World Health Organization, 2007) . The structure of these systems was developed during the 1970s to deal with a troubling lack of reliability in assigning diagnoses, which threatened the credibility of psychiatry as a medical specialty.
The product arrived in the form of the DSM- III (1980) , which threw out most of the old system based on psychodynamic assumptions about etiology. Instead, the DSM-III offered an atheoretical descriptive approach based upon readily observable signs and symptoms. In particular, the DSM's polythetic criteria list provided a mantle of objectivity in that a list of symptoms was provided for each category, and the diagnosis was assigned when a patient exhibited a designated number from that list (e.g., five of nine for a major depressive episode). Because the disorders were presumed to be underlying entities, it seemed not to matter very much that a large number of different combinations of symptoms could all be sufficient for assigning a diagnosis. In some cases, one or even no symptoms needed to be in common for the same diagnosis to be applied.
This system proved to be highly successful, spawning a generation of growth in research and treatment. However, succeeding decades of research and clinical experience revealed a growing number of difficulties. Some observers worried that a truly valuefree system could not be devised (e.g., Blashfield & Livesley, 1991) . From a scientific perspective, problems of excessive comorbidity and heterogeneity of disorders surfaced even before the DSM-IV revisions were completed (e.g., Clark, Watson, & Reynolds, 1995) .
The framers of the DSM-III recognized some of the potential problems, such as with heterogeneity: A "misconception is that all individuals described as having the same mental disorder are alike in all important ways. Although all the individuals described as having the same mental disorder show at least the defining features of the disorder, they may well differ in other important ways that may affect clinical management and outcome." (APA, 1980, p. 6) However, the DSM-III became a victim of its own success: The system was so thoroughly specified and defined that the categories were rapidly reified to take on the status of real disease entities, and spread throughout the medical, educational, insurance, and legal systems (Hyman, 2010) . Thus, research generated under the DSM was overwhelmingly framed under the implicit assumption of valid disease entities that could be differentiated from normality and from each other, rather than exploring concerns of validity and heterogeneous mechanisms.
More problems came to light with the advent of genetics, neuroimaging, and rigorous tasks and measurements from behavioral science. These data increasingly indicated that genetic risk patterns are common to multiple disorders, and similarly that findings from neuroimaging and behavioral science failed to map onto the standard diagnostic distinctions (e.g., Hyman, 2007; Sanislow et al., 2010) . This is not surprising, given that very little systematic knowledge about the functioning of the brain, or about brain-behavior relationships, was available during the time that the DSM structure was completed. Moreover, the disorder heterogeneity posed significant problems for the development of effective new treatments. As one group of scientists from a pharmaceutical company noted, "On average, a marketed psychiatric drug is efficacious in approximately half of the patients who take it. One reason for this low response rate is the artificial grouping of heterogeneous syndromes with different pathophysiological mechanisms into one disorder." (Wong, Yocca, Smith, & Lee, 2010 , p. 1276 From the perspective of a funding institute whose mission is to reduce the burden of suffering from mental disorders through research, the problem may be stated as follows: It is clear that a diagnostic system based upon empirical data from genetics, neurobiology, and behavioral science is desirable to move toward an era of precision medicine where patients are diagnosed and treated according to accurate and appropriately fine-tuned assessments. However, such a database cannot be created as long as research grants are funded almost exclusively in terms of the current categories, given a system where the machinery is geared toward regulatory approvals for new medications with DSM/ICD indications.
How to proceed? The noted Welsh geneticist Michael Owen is quoted here at length because he captures nearly perfectly the rationale and spirit of the RDoC project in discussing the implications of an ordered neurodevelopmental disorder continuum that spans intellectual disability, autism, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder: These [genetic] findings strongly suggest that research on disease pathogenesis should not focus on specific diagnostic categories but should rather seek to identify the cross-diagnostic processes upon which the effects of these and other as yet undiscovered risk alleles converge. . . . we must also be prepared to explore novel dimensional and categorical approaches that cut across current diagnostic groups and better capture underlying psychology and biology. It is likely that mechanistic insights will be most fruitfully sought by studying endophenotypes and by taking a cross-disorder or diagnostically neutral approach. These will likely be both top-down, relating specific psychopathological syndromes to phenotypes defined by cognitive psychology and neuroscience rather than diagnosis, and bottom-up, relating genotype to fundamental measures of neuronal and synaptic function in human, animal, and cellular studies. (Owen, 2012, p. 906) Unfortunately, research embodying these principles is distinguished by scarcity. The goal of the RDoC project is precisely to promote these kinds of promising studies that can accumulate to inform nosologies.
Summary Description of the NIMH RDoC Initiative
Detailed descriptions of the process and structure of the RDoC project are available elsewhere so need not be covered here in detail (e.g., Insel et al., 2010; Sanislow et al., 2010; Morris & Cuthbert, 2012) . In brief, the NIMH workgroup 1 convened to instantiate RDoC followed closely the elaboration of the Strategic Plan's Aim 1.4. This calls for a process to bring together experts to "identify the fundamental behavioral components that may span multiple disorders . . . and that are more amenable to neuroscience approaches." The workgroup decided to group these dimensions in five major domains of functioning: positive valence (i.e., appetitive motivational systems), negative valence, cognition, social processes, and arousal/regulatory systems. One workshop was held for each domain, to specify the particular dimensions that would be included in that domain; for instance, the outcome of the negative valence workshop comprised dimensions of acute threat, potential threat, sustained threat, loss, and frustrative nonreward. Each dimension was characterized by measurements at a number of units of analysis, that is, genes, molecules, cells, circuits, physiology (e.g., heart rate or cortisol), behavior, and self-reports. Graphically, this organization formed a two-dimensional matrix with the dimensions (and their superordinate domains) in the rows, and the units of analysis in the columns.
Several features emphasized the behavioral and psychological aspects of the overall scheme. The workgroup specified two criteria that had to be met for a dimension to be included in the matrix. First, there had to be evidence for the construct validity of the dimension, and second, there had to be evidence for a neural circuit or system that implements the behavior associated with the dimension. The dimensions are formally termed "constructs" in keeping with classical psychometrics. The columns of the matrix were termed "units of analysis" rather than "levels of analysis" to avoid an implication of scientific hegemony as one goes from self-reports and behavior to molecules and genes. These points are addressed in more detail in a subsequent section.
RDoC incorporates a number of features that diverge from the usual approaches to psychiatric classification. First, RDoC adopts a fully dimensional approach to the constructs, as many scholars have called for in recent years (e.g., Clark et al., 1995; Krueger & Markon, 2011; Craddock & Owen, 2010) . The workgroup also endorsed the language in Aim 1.4 to "determine the full range of variation, from normal to abnormal, among the fundamental components to improve understanding of what is typical versus pathological." Thus, RDoC embodies a strong translational approach that is not restricted to a range of severity within some zone of pathology, but rather covers the entire gamut of functioning. This aspect has important implications for how an investigator might go about validating an RDoC construct: It is not sufficient to gather the usual clinical sample, but rather, the researcher must consider how to recruit so as to ascertain a sample that has appropriate variation to evaluate the dimension(s) of interest. One contribution to this goal is to include subjects from treatment-seeking samples who fail to meet usual criteria for the disorder of interest ("forme fruste") or who could be diagnosed with a less severe disorder (e.g., schizophreniform disorder or psychotic episode NOS rather than schizophrenia). Another possibility is to recruit a more varied control sample that can contribute to variance from the "normal" end of the distribution, rather than gathering a group of "supernormals" who have no past history of disorder.
Although RDoC is labeled as an experimental classification approach, it is actually not a classification system in the formal sense. It might better be termed "an experiment toward classification." Notably, RDoC does not have any a priori specifications for defining disorders-that is, it does not involve criteria by which any given individual will be given a diagnosis. This omission is intentional. Another of the steps called for by aim 1.4 is to "develop reliable and valid measures of these fundamental components . . . for use in basic studies and in more clinical settings"; development of appropriate measurement is obviously necessary for a quantitatively based system to be instantiated in the future.
RDoC's mandate is not to jump prematurely into the hazardous depths of defining specific criteria for various disorders-even if they were to be novel circuit-based, dimensional entities. Such precocious efforts might well result in reified dimensions that become just as much of an impediment to research as DSM categories have proven to be in recent years. Rather, the business of RDoC is to concentrate on developing new measures to characterize these constructs with respect to the various units of analysis, and then to validate the constructs using the nomological net approach that has classically been used for construct validation in psychology (MacCorquodale & Meehl, 1948) . A key goal is to achieve ratio or interval scales for as many constructs and units of analysis as possible, as opposed to the leaner ordinal scales of the DSM. Only in this manner can diagnosis begin to approximate modern psychometric standards. With such capabilities, it would then become feasible to establish quantifiable standards for diagnosis.
An advantage of this kind of programmatic development would be the ability to establish empirically based cutpoints for mild, moderate, and severe levels of disorder to tailor treatments to the most safe and efficacious treatment for that range of pathology. For example, such a capability might have mitigated the rancorous debate regarding the attenuated psychosis syndrome proposed for DSM-5 (which was ultimately excluded, largely lest pharmaceutical companies be encouraged to market antipsychotic drugs to young adults who do not need them). Further, ratio and ordinal scales could afford more refined cutpoints as clinical studies provide new data regarding risk and optimal treatments (as has been done repeatedly in the hypertension literature).
RDoC is neutral regarding current debates about mental disorders in two differing respects. First, no position is taken about the relationship of RDoC to any specific DSM category. The current categories have grown so entrenched that using them as a framework for examining conventional disorder categories is nearly impossible. It is difficult to say at this early stage whether psychopathology may in future be better described-and, importantly, treated more effectively-in terms of construct-based dimensions that encompass multiple current categories ("mild emotion dysregulation," "moderate working memory dysfunction," "low impulse control") rather than with the current system. It might intuitively seem that a more likely outcome is that traditional terms such as "schizophrenia" and "depression" will be retained for their value in communication, but that their meanings will change. For instance, "cancer" and "heart disease" are still useful terms even though oncologists do not treat "cancer" as a unitary disease entity. As a handy clinical shorthand, such an outcome could be benign, but problems of dealing with heterogeneity and comorbidity would remain. For example, does the clinician treat posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) differently when comorbid depression is present, and what difference does it make if the PTSD involves blunted rather than exaggerated emotional reactivity (e.g., see Lanius, Bluhm, Lanius, & Pain, 2006,; McTeague & Lang, 2012) . These issues typify the problems with both research and treatment in the current environment.
A second area of neutrality for RDoC concerns the fundamental definitions of mental illness. The DSM-5 process revived earlier discussions about the philosophy and epistemology of mental disorders (e.g., Phillips, Frances, Cerullo, Chardavoyne, Decker, et al., 2012; Wakefield, 2007) . Although space prohibits a systematic discussion of the dense thicket of ideas in this area, one observation about much of the debate is that it is conducted largely on philosophic grounds, with relatively little recourse to scientific data. This has resulted in theoretically derived disorder conceptions that have proved resistant to consensus. In contrast, these sorts of debates do not seem to arise for blood pressure levels or cholesterol counts. Definitions of risk states and diseases are based upon empirical associations with outcomes such as myocardial infarcts and strokes, and can be adjusted on the basis of ongoing clinical and epidemiological studies. RDoC seeks to promote an empirically based approach, so that sufficient data will guide decisions about the dimensions most salient for psychopathology, and further, to optimize relevant cutpoints for different types of interventions. Such a position may well appear naïve to wellversed readers, but it reflects a need to cut the Gordian tangle of diverse findings about heterogeneous clusters of symptoms (e.g., Phillips et al., 2012) .
The various foundational and operational facets of the RDoC project are well exemplified in the articles in this special section of the journal. Berenbaum's article addresses some of the issues that we have outlined above, and is considered here first as a continuation of the discussion regarding the scientific basis for RDoC. For the latter reason, Patrick et al.'s article provides an exemplary account of the type of multisystem theoretical and analytical approaches that RDoC espouses. Finally, Bilder's article is important for discussing how the scientific process for RDoC may be developed and systematized in a way that can accommodate the necessary growth of the overall framework. These articles are considered in turn.
Response to Berenbaum's Commentary
We shall first consider the thoughtful critique by Howard Berenbaum, which initially addresses the nature of psychopathology, its measurement, and what is required for its classification. The article argues that several kinds of factors (e.g., neural, interper-sonal, cultural, migratory) contribute to psychopathology, and in different amounts. Citing Miller and Keller (2000) , the critique declines to presume a priori that a particular type of factor, especially biology, is generally more important or fundamental than others, and would treat claims about the relationships among types of factors as theoretical rather than factual. In this context, the primary focus of the Berenbaum critique is how to conceptualize certain kinds of thoughts, feelings, and behavior that constitute psychiatric problems, and whether the RDoC concepts are adequate to the task. Because the article engages a number of issues that go to the heart of the RDoC approach, we consider it first and at length, in the hope that this discussion will clearly illustrate various essentials of the endeavor.
The critique contains several distinct but related arguments. The first argument flows from several assumptions about the nature of mental disorder to conclusions about what is needed for the classification of psychopathology. In barebones form: 1) Psychopathology is properly understood from biological, psychological, and sociological perspectives; 2) The contribution of any single perspective is no more important than those of the others; 3) Mental disorders are properly conceptualized as clusters of signs and symptoms that converge upon unobserved hypothetical constructs within a larger nomological net; 4) Understanding a construct is a matter of elaborating its nomological net; 5) Therefore, research on mental disorders must elaborate nomological nets. The second argument involves some assumptions about the nature of the RDoC concepts. Accordingly, 1) a priori assumptions about the nature of psychopathology will influence the kind of questions asked and the research conducted; 2) The RDoC framework construes mental illnesses as brain disorders; 3) The RDoC framework assumes biological phenomena to be more fundamental than psychological phenomena; 4) Factors such as belief formation, shame, and social context, for which animal models with associated neural circuits are not feasible, are unlikely to be encompassed by the RDoC framework; 5) Therefore, important factors such as belief formation, shame, and social context are unlikely to fall within the RDoC framework.
RDoC and Biological Fundamentalism
In light of these two arguments, Berenbaum's critique highlights some limitations of biological fundamentalism, mind-body identity claims, and reductionism, and warns against aspects of the RDoC approach that could gratuitously hinder psychopathology research. Although the first argument, about the nature of mental disorders, could provide ample grist for discussion, the purpose of the present commentary is to consider the RDoC concepts. Thus, we shall here focus on the second argument, about the nature of the RDoC framework and its ramifications.
For Berenbaum, a crucial issue is the view that "the RDoC framework conceptualized mental illnesses as brain disorders" (Insel et al., 2010, p. 749) . Other attentive commentators (e.g., see Miller, 2010 , for an astute analysis of this issue) have also noted various statements from the NIMH that echo this kind of language. Whereas it is understandable that such comments prompt concern from sophisticated scholars, the statements are interpretable as an expression of the need to move beyond symptom-based nosologies for mental disorders toward diagnostic systems based upon mechanisms. Granted, as with any collection of scientists, one can readily find diverse philosophical and scientific viewpoints expressed in various statements from the NIMH. However, although a conscientious reader can detect in publications emanating from the NIMH varying language on reductionism and on the role of biology vis à vis psychology, an essential point is that the RDoC initiative does not rely upon assumptions of eliminative reductionism, or even of biological fundamentalism (e.g., Sanislow et al., 2010) . In this regard, it is important to note that the RDoC initiative does not depend conceptually upon a claim of mind-brain identity.
Berenbaum acknowledges implicitly that the RDoC approach is not inherently reductionistic, by citing Sanislow et al.'s, 2010 observation that RDoC's focus on lower level mechanisms does not entail the elimination of higher order constructs. More to the point, Berenbaum's analysis appears to have missed its mark regarding the implications of such claims for the conceptual viability of the RDoC ideas. His critique suggests that the RDoC concepts rest heavily on an assumption that biological phenomena are more fundamental than psychological phenomena. Although it is plausible to suppose that RDoC's particular interest in genes, cells, and neural circuits follows from a "core assumption that mental disorders are brain disorders" (Berenbaum, 2013, p. 897) , this controversial assumption is neither essential nor inherent to the RDoC initiative; rather, as noted above, evidence for a valid (psychological) construct and an implementing neural circuit were the twin criteria used for including dimensions in the matrix.
In fact, RDoC's aim of elevating the contributions of biology, in concert with the contributions of a science of behavior, to an integrated science of psychopathology is defensible without recourse to any mind-brain identity assumptions at all. Rather, one need only assume that integrated psychobiological explanations of psychiatric problems have a decent chance of being richer and more powerful than theories that are exclusively psychological or exclusively biological (cf. Kendler's recent article [2012] on empirically based pluralism). This integrative approach is consistent with the kind of mechanistic explanations advocated by contemporary theorists such as Bechtel who defend the autonomy of psychological accounts: "With the advent of cognitive neuroscience, mechanistic explanations of mental phenomena have increasingly included identification of the brain parts responsible for the component operations . . . . The goal of such research is not just to learn where operations occur, but to use such knowledge to further constrain and revise proposed accounts of mechanisms." (Bechtel, 2007, p. 175) This quotation captures the essence of the RDoC emphasis on integral psychobiological constructs. The RDoC goal of elaboration and convergent validation of integrated multidisciplinary constructs is inconsistent with the goal of demonstrating some kind of mind-brain identity.
RDoC and NIMH Priorities
The Berenbaum critique correctly identifies some implications of the RDoC initiative for NIMH priorities for psychopathology research, such as an NIMH preference for research that elevates the contributions of neurobiology to an integrative science of psychopathology. Berenbaum is concerned that RDoC-oriented research would not explore factors without clear ties to neurobiology. Ceteris paribus, research questions that conform to the RDoC concepts indeed can be expected to be of greater priority for NIMH funding, at the expense of research that does not so con-form. A complication, of course, is that ceteris are rarely paribus, leaving substantial room for any particular project to be deemed more promising than another, notwithstanding its alignment or nonalignment with the RDoC template.
In the three years since the inception of the RDoC initiative, two NIMH funding opportunities have required conformity to the RDoC concepts, occupying less than 1% of NIMH annual expenditures on clinical research. There is hope among some NIMH staff that the proportion of RDoC-oriented applications and grants will gradually increase as the principles gain broader recognition and acceptance among clinical researchers. However, it is not expected here that a project's RDoC conformity per se will suffice to garner NIMH support, or that nonconformity itself will prevent such support. This leaves at least some room for research that is strictly biological, as well as for research that is strictly psychological.
The critique suggests that factors "for which animal models are unlikely to be feasible are least likely to be included within RDoC . . . because they are unlikely to be directly or specifically associated with neural circuits." and offers the examples of belief formation and shame as presumably important areas that would be neglected. In fact, although animal models have traditionally played a large role in drug development, there is increasing recognition that the brains of animals, especially those of the rodents whose brains are very frequently recruited for research on pharmaceuticals, differ so dramatically from those of humans that demonstrating a new therapeutic target or the efficacy of a new compound for a rodent analogue of a human problem can be misleading. Indeed, the translation of animal models has recently been questioned even for neurological disorders, leading to widespread concerns about their overall utility for the treatment development process (e.g., Scott, Kranz, Cole, Lincecum, Thompson, et al., 2008) . A rat might develop something like delusions, hopelessness, or shame, but even if defensible theories of these constructs could be validated with rodents, their implementation in rat brains would certainly differ from the way these functions are instantiated in human brains. For starters, it is not clear that the rat brain has a prefrontal cortex (Preuss, 1995) , and, to borrow a lesson from computer science, even the best-laid programs can be vexingly platform-specific. The upshot is that although animal models can be valuable heuristics for discoveries about psychopathology and its neurobiological implementation, they are too far from exhaustive informants to be prerequisite for research with humans. The RDoC steering committee and the NIMH are well aware of this.
Berenbaum's animal-model/neural circuit concern also gives rise in part to his conclusion that important phenomena such as belief formation and shame are unlikely to be directly or specifically associated with neural circuits, and therefore "least likely to be included within RDoC." Several considerations bear upon this matter.
The NIMH (like all NIH Institutes) must necessarily target its research priorities selectively in the face of budget constraints and declining purchasing power. The Institute has been consistent in stating that those illnesses that comprise the greatest overall burden of suffering, and those that absorb the greatest amount of human and financial resources in providing care, are its current priorities. These include (but are not limited to) such areas as psychotic disorders, mood and anxiety disorders, and autism spectrum disorders. Many areas that represent legitimate topics for clinical science, such as shame, are necessarily relegated to a somewhat lower priority because of harsh budget realities. Even within these areas, however, an application that receives a competitive score is likely to be funded as long as the connections to clinically important problems are drawn persuasively.
Another of Berenbaum's examples, belief formation, raises different issues. It is not entirely clear whether the concern regards a "belief" construct as such, or whether it is about the process of arriving at beliefs. With respect to the latter, belief formation is by definition a developmental, or dynamic, phenomenon. Such trajectories are emphasized in NIMH descriptions of the RDoC concepts. Thus, the RDoC template would afford no disadvantage to a construct such as belief formation simply by virtue of its complexity relative to "static" phenomena that are sampled over very short periods. Although Berenbaum's critique does not explicitly question how the RDoC template would encompass dynamic phenomena, that issue is worth this brief attention here.
The question of a "belief" construct per se relates to an issue regarding the most appropriate "grain size" for constructs in the RDoC framework, a concern voiced in the workgroup's very first internal summary of critical issues in March 2009. The RDoC initiative is intended to uncouple research questions from concepts that might be too heterogeneously large for productive validation against biological phenomena of smaller "granularity." Heterogeneous in this case means that the explanandum takes the form of diverse and nonoverlapping features. A working RDoC assumption is that granularity mismatch mitigates against successful multilevel analyses. Whether a phenomenon such as "belief" or "belief formation" would be sufficiently narrow to comport with successful multilevel analysis is not immediately obvious and seems unlikely. If "belief" or "belief formation" is a heterogeneous phenomenon, then, as is accurately appraised by the Berenbaum critique, it would seem to be an unpromising candidate for study within the RDoC guidelines.
To expand upon this point, the clinical phenomena to be explained in an RDoC-oriented application must be narrower than most traditional diagnostic entities or concepts. The RDoC approach would be to specify which homogeneous presenting problem or problems it seeks to explain via a psychobiological construct, along with a theoretical account of the relationship of the explanatory construct to the explanandum. Attempts to explain heterogeneous DSM entities would contradict the RDoC approach, as would attempts to explain heterogeneous non-DSM explananda. Substituting a novel heterogeneous phenomenon, for example, "belief," for a heterogeneous traditional DSM diagnostic entity would not conform to the RDoC approach.
A related concern is that RDoC seeks (particularly in its formative stages) to establish a firm foundation for its novel approach to the study of various clinical phenomena through a relatively small subset of well-validated basic functions (the constructs), considering disorders in terms of dysregulation/dysfunction in these functions. Accordingly, a first step in most RDoC-oriented research projects would be to develop hypotheses about how particular construct(s) might be used to explain an important clinical manifestation. A second step might be to pare the number of putative explanatory constructs, in part by eliminating concepts that the scientific literature suggests represent a single function but have acquired different names as a result of divergent research traditions. As these steps imply, achieving an appropriate match between the granularity of the clinical phenomena and of the explanatory construct may often be an iterative enterprise, and thus an appropriate component of an overall RDoC research program.
Thus, as one avenue for approaching Berenbaum's concern, perhaps a narrowly defined kind of belief or perception, such as "delusion" or "hallucination," could be limited enough to afford some likelihood of convergence with variables of the smaller granularity that characterize other levels of analysis. Aligning the granularity of the measures and phenomena to be related via multilevel analyses is an important goal of the RDoC initiative. Berenbaum asserts that "in addition to proposing and testing broad, comprehensive theories of mental disorders, it will also be useful to researchers to develop theories of individual signs and symptoms, such as affective flattening and delusions, and to conduct research on mechanisms proposed in such theories." (2013, p. 899) . It is precisely this kind of approach that is being promoted by the NIMH RDoC initiative, but also with dimensional assessment and multilevel analyses that include biological variables.
A third consideration regarding Berenbaum's animal-model/ neural circuit concern is the importance of research that relies exclusively or primarily on self-reports. This raises some philosophical and scientific issues that are too extensive to engage in this venue. It is nonetheless feasible here to sketch how reliance upon self-report data comports with the RDoC concepts. As noted earlier, Berenbaum is concerned about a class of phenomena "that reside within individuals" but for which animal models are not feasible, and that are not directly or specifically associated with neural circuits. He cites the importance of shame and beliefs for psychopathology and psychotherapy, especially cognitive therapy, and anticipates a shortcoming in the RDoC approach in that it would not accommodate the study of these and other such phenomena. Berenbaum is concerned with classifying thoughts, feelings, and behavior, but these are very different kinds of things, such that their understanding and classification present different challenges.
Classifying behavior is relatively straightforward compared with classifying thoughts and feelings, in that behavior can often be observed directly. Classification can then proceed from accurate observations to some rationale, such as formal similarity or association in nature, for defining categories. Arguably, thoughts and feelings are not observable, and so must be inferred (for a contrasting view, see Dretske, 1999 Dretske, , 2000 . Traditionally, great weight has been accorded in psychopathology to self-reports of thoughts and feelings, and such reported experiences have often been considered as "primary" phenomena to be explained. An alternative view (e.g., Kozak & Miller, 1982; Miller & Kozak, 1993 ) to this subjectivism is that self-reported experiences have the logical status of fallible hypotheses about function. That is to say that experiential claims constitute a kind of "folk" psychology of the self that, as such, should be neither assumed veridical nor simply discounted. (For a similar but more developed account see Daniel Dennett's "heterophenomenology" in Consciousness Explained, 1991.) In citing Kozak and Miller's article, Berenbaum might seem to acknowledge their agnostic view of the veridicality of reports of experience, but his interest in classifying thoughts and feelings leaves ambiguity about his own position. From the RDoC perspective, one would seek neither to explain nor classify selfreported thoughts or feelings, but rather, one might use the selfreports to inform hypotheses about psychobiological mechanisms (constructs) that in turn would be subject to convergent validation, via multiple levels of analysis, to explain some narrowly defined problem behavior. Ultimately, if the RDoC initiative proves successful, psychobiological mechanisms might usurp the telltale role of self-reported experiences in a renovated diagnostic system.
A problem with this tidy formulation of reports of experiences as fallible hypotheses about function arises if self-report is the only available indicator of a clinical problem, such as a putative delusion, hallucination, or feeling of shame, or if self-report data provide resolution that is simply unavailable from other indicators. Subjective interpretations, regardless of their fallibility, can contribute to a subject's functioning, and self-report is often the most efficient way, if not the only way, to discover these interpretations. In other words, meaning matters, and the language of self-report can code nuances of meaning with fine resolution. Mostly, it is not self-reports themselves (observable behavior) that are psychiatric problems, but rather, the unobservable thoughts or feelings to which they are supposed to refer, and any related ill-motivated behavior. If one does not adopt an expedient working assumption of the veridicality of self-reports, and there are no available converging measures from different levels of analysis, then one forsakes capacity to study various important problems. Although the RDoC approach provides no elegant solution to this puzzle, in pure form, it would nonetheless avoid taking self-reports as veridical. However, unless or until more resolved construct ascertainment becomes available, the study of certain kinds of psychiatric clinical problems will continue to require expedient but scientifically awkward presumptions about the referents of self-reports. In sum, however, Berenbaum is right in supposing that research that relies exclusively on self-report data would fall outside of RDoC approach.
The fact that RDoC constructs necessarily involve biological measures should not be taken to imply that self-report measures alone have no validity or utility. Notwithstanding oft-cited limitations of self-report measures (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) , such measures are not necessarily less valid or less useful than measures in other domains (Haeffel & Howard, 2010) . In fact, they have routinely been found more useful for predicting psychiatric problems (e.g., Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1976; Haeffel et al., 2008; Kwapil, 1998) than any available biological measure. Furthermore, the predictive utility of self-reports need not depend upon presumed veridicality. In other words, subjective perception of a situation can sometimes be a better predictor of a person's functioning in that situation than objective measurement of the situation itself (Cotton, 1980) . The explanatory role of self-reports in psychopathology is reminiscent of Dennett's (1978) construal of the role of intentional constructs in psychological explanation. He argued that humans can be construed as rational "intentional systems" by supposing them to be possessed of information (i.e., beliefs) and directed by goals (i.e., desires), and that intentional theories of behavior have attractive utility in predicting behavior, especially when they are the best predictors available. However, when intentional theories run up against predictive limitations, as they always do, there is no scientific recourse because intentional theories presume, rather than explain, rationality. Dennett's resolution of this dialectic between the palpable but limited utility of intentional constructs and their ultimate inadequacy is the metaphor of the loan. Accordingly, an intentional construct constitutes a theoretical loan that currently affords imperfect and very useful prediction, but must later be "paid back" in mechanistic theory that explains, rather than presumes, rationality. A parallel with the role of self-report data is illustrative: self-report data are very useful but do not provide perfect prediction, and so must be invested with multiple converging measures at multiple levels of analysis to enhance explanatory power. The RDoC initiative is intended to promote this kind of investment toward theoretical debt-reduction.
We turn now to the remaining two articles in this special section. In contrast to the conceptual concerns expressed by Berenbaum, these articles address aspects of the actual implementation of RDoC principles in research. We comment first on an outstanding example of one particular research program gathering RDoC-relevant data with an innovative update to traditional construct-validation paradigm. We then turn to considerations regarding the knowledge structure and organization of data for RDoC and the need for formal modeling methodologies-RDoC in a "big data" future. Patrick, Venables, Yancy, Hicks, Nelson & Kramer (2013) present the results of what they term a "construct-network" methodology for psychopathology. In progress for well over a decade, their work represents a pioneering program of psychophysiological research that departed at the outset from traditional single DSMcategory designs; the research is intrinsically structured in a dimensional manner that anticipates (and has contributed to) the structure of the RDoC framework. The dimension of interest has generally been referred to as "externalizing" in the research literature; the corresponding construct is Cognitive Control in the RDoC matrix, but is also referred to as Impulsivity, Constraint, or Effortful Control. The latter term, stemming from the work of Rothbart and Posner on the development of attentional control systems (e.g., Rothbart, Sheese, Rueda, & Posner, 2011) , denotes the ties of this work to developmental trajectories-another important focus of the RDoC project. A notable aspect of their research comprises the alternation between smaller laboratory studies to explore mechanisms, and larger correlational studies to examine the clinical significance of the constructs. This process is likely to be valuable throughout the span of the RDoC effort, but particularly in the early stages when construct validation and establishing the relationship of the constructs to DSM/ICD syndromes will require a preponderance of effort.
Response to Patrick et al. Commentary
A number of features of the research deserve emphasis. First, there is a focus on trait dimensions, rather than categorical DSM diagnostic categories. This not only pertains to a range of severity in clinical samples, but spans the entire range of functioning, from excessive behavioral inhibition to extreme disinhibition. This development antedated an important component of the stated aims in Strategy 1.4, as noted above on page 4. (http://www.nimh.nih.gov/ about/strategic-planning-reports/index.shtml#strategic-objective1) Second, there is an explicit mapping of physiological responses with psychometric measures of externalizing. As one notable feature of this aspect, there is no assumption that self-report measures are taken as the "real" indicators of the construct, with which physiological measures would be expected to correlate; rather, physiology and self-reports are simply taken as two distinct domains in measuring the construct. Further, a third positive feature is the examination of covariance among multiple physiological measures, which typically leads to a more stable estimate of any presumed latent variable or construct. Finally, consistent with the point above that self-reports are not seen as the defining indicant of a construct, a particular emphasis is that psychological conceptions of the construct can be informed by new physiological data. This idea resonates with the point by Bechtel above about the use of biological measures to constrain and inform theories about mechanisms (Bechtel, 2007) . All of these points exemplify the methods described by the NIMH workgroup for conducting RDoC-themed studies.
Several advantageous features of the dimensional aspect deserve highlighting. As compared with traditional clinical research designs, the dimensional design means that there are no control groups; rather, subjects lacking any clinical features comprise one part of the full dimensional range. This mitigates questions as to how inclusive or exclusive the criteria for control groups need to be, for example, with respect to prior psychiatric history or substance abuse. Further, such designs obviate the need to focus on one particular DSM disorder to study, or to conduct a series of studies on various DSM disorders and then face the problem of determining whether the latent variable connecting them (e.g., here, externalizing) operates the same way across disorders. As Patrick et al. (2013) note, "focusing neurobehavioral research on trait-like disinhibitory propensities can prove markedly more efficient than piecemeal investigation of markers for putatively discrete disorders within this spectrum of psychopathology."
Finally, a dimensional approach helps resolve the problems of comorbidity in studies of DSM disorders. The occurrence of excessive co-occurrence among disorders represents both a conceptual problem via its suggestion of some underlying dimension that is being overlooked, and a practical problem in terms of how to deal with design and analysis issues. As noted in another article from this group, "Comorbidity among mental disorders has been an impediment to progress because researchers are forced to make a number of confusing choices regarding fundamental issues in research design. For example, in work on the etiology of alcohol use and problems, should persons with antisocial features be included or excluded? The Externalizing Spectrum Model resolves these problems by reconceptualizing the targets for clinical inquiry in a manner derived directly from data on the empirical organization of externalizing phenotypes." (Krueger, Markon, Patrick, Benning, & Kramer, 2007, p. 661) In the RDoC model, "comorbidity" might instead refer to the exploration of relationships between two or more dimensional constructs. Rather than the large number of pairwise combinations between various categories, the analysis devolves to the covariation between two dimensional variables, potentially uncovering interactions and nonlinearities that can help explicate particular clinical problems. These kinds of analyses might help explicate mechanisms that affect relationships between systems-for example, the correlation of "fear" and "distress" disorders in structural models of internalizing (e.g., Krueger & Markon, 2006) , or recent reports of neuroplasticity resulting from interactions between prefrontal cortex and mesolimbic dopamine systems in drug abuse (e.g., Kalivas, Volkow, & Seamans, 2005) .
It is worth noting in this regard that RDoC studies will typically involve new approaches to inclusion criteria (as noted above), but also to exclusion criteria. Particularly in initial studies, it may be heuristic to specify exclusion criteria that result in samples with "appropriate" variance relative to the experimental question. Thus, a study of anhedonia or emotional regulation might recruit subjects whose diagnoses could include major depression, dysthymia, and various anxiety disorders (as well as forme fruste versions and a range of controls); however, patients with psychotic disorders or active substance abuse might be excluded out of concern that other features of their clinical characteristics could obscure an understanding of the mechanisms under study. Subsequently, however, successful explication of a particular mechanism might well be extended quite profitably to other classes of psychopathology.
Patrick's research program links the various units of analysis through two different types of paradigms. Laboratory research experiments are used to develop physiological measures, whereas correlational studies are used to examine personality traits and/or clinical dispositions in large samples. This approach helps provide the iterative nature of the overall research program, in which studies in each paradigm are informed by projects in the other. In sum, for researchers wondering how RDoC designs can be conceived and executed, Patrick's program serves as a model example.
Response to Bilder et al. Commentary
The overarching theme of the Bilder et al. (this volume) article concerns the development of knowledge structures that can serve to organize multilevel information that will be gathered in RDoC research. This theme addresses a clear need. RDoC so far has necessarily concentrated on the conceptual aspects of the framework, in conceiving the new structure and attempting to communicate its differences from DSM/ICD nosologies. Little attention has been paid to the kinds of knowledge structures needed to support the complex analyses and data mining that will be required for such highdimensional data. Considerable progress can, of course, be made with traditional methods of examining the relationships among variables within the confines of one study. However, to realize the full potential of the RDoC concept, more expansive methods will be necessary. The authors furnish a well-developed example of a neural circuit description using an ontology language, providing an actual data structure (available for download) that represents the working memory circuit and construct as articulated in the relevant RDoC workshop. They also provide engaging illustrations of the sophisticated analytic techniques that could be applied to appropriately constructed sets of data. Bilder et al. (2013) discuss a number of obstacles to the development of ontological structures. The first concerns the urgent need for better phenotypes, particularly for the kinds of quantitative measurements required for multilevel analyses in RDoC. As the authors note, genomics is relatively well advanced, whereas phenomics lags considerably (see also, e.g., Green, Munafò, DeYoung, Fossella, Fan, & Gray, 2008) . For instance, the NIMH Psychiatric Genetics Repository contains only the primary DSM diagnosis as the sole element of phenotypic information. This desideratum was anticipated by NIMH Strategic Plan Aim 1.4, in that one of its subaims read, "Develop reliable and valid measures of these fundamental components of mental disorders for use in basic studies and in more clinical settings." As this statement implies, the emphasis is not only to develop new tasks and measures for the various constructs, but also to evolve procedures that generate reliable and valid results with minimal subject burden-a critical consideration not only for gathering numerous measures for multilevel analysis, but also for piloting new procedures as part of the continual process of revising and enhancing the matrix. A set of such measures, originally conceived for studies of cognitive deficits in schizophrenia by the Cognitive Neuroscience Test Reliability and Clinical Applications for Schizophrenia group (CNTRACS; Gold, 2012) , serves as exemplars of this goal and of the considerable effort necessary to achieve it.
Another obstacle concerns the ability to relate genotypes to phenotypes. As the authors discuss, the very modest variance accounted for by genetic variants in GWAS studies is not improved by employing endophenotypes (synonymous with intermediate phenotypes, in their view). This point leads to a discussion of the advantages of endophenotypes that function as mediators, that is, as part of the causal chain of mechanisms that result in behavior (and any attendant dysfunction). This might be considered as a special case of the nomological net approach for validating constructs, in which high correlations among certain measures are used for construct validation; here, two measures will correlate highly because one mediates the other. This strategy appears promising in many instances, such as the working memory example that is presented. In some instances, validating these relationships may depend upon assumptions about causative relationships that require further parsing of various circuit aspects and individual differences. For instance, McTeague and Lang (2012) used emotional imagery to study fear-potentiated startle in different groups of anxiety disorders patients. All subjects reported that their imagery was equally (and highly) aversive and arousing. However, groups characterized by specific fears (specific phobia, single-trauma PTSD) responded with palpable fear-potentiated startle, whereas groups reporting high levels of overall distress (GAD, chronic PTSD) displayed negligible startle responses. Thus, working out the relationships among startle, reports of arousal during aversive imagery, and overall tonic distress will require further explication before the chains of causation in the relevant circuits can be established for different subgroups of patients. This point should not be regarded as a criticism of the obvious utility of working toward models that permit use of the machinery of causal inference analysis, but rather as recognition that part of the task for RDoC researchers will be to establish the conditions (and subgroups) for which various causal relationships may, and may not, hold.
As mentioned above, the authors present a compelling example of how a knowledge framework could be used to examine four specific hypotheses about Working Memory Maintenance in schizophrenia, using the Cognitive Atlas (Poldrack, Kittur, Kalar, Miller, Seppa, et al., 2011) . One cannot read this section without being convinced of the utility and promise of the approach, and the authors point out the concern that formal multilevel models can help avoid the problem of dimensions (or categories) that add little incremental validity. The incorporation of subject-level data, when appropriate data sets become available, will be a valuable extension of these techniques to pursue means of parsing subject groups into more homogeneous subgroups that cross syndromal boundaries. For example, data just emerging from the Bipolar-Schizophrenia Network for Intermediate Phenotypes (BSNIP) indicates three clusters ("biotypes") based on a combination of psychophysiological and neurocognitive measures; cluster membership was only modestly related to DSM diagnosis, but was related strongly to gray matter loss, cognitive control impairments, and "sensorimotor noise" (Clementz, Keshavan, Pearlson, Sweeney, & Tamminga, 2013 ).
An important issue going forward will involve consideration of the time and resources needed to curate and maintain these large ontological structures and subject-level databases. As with other recent technological advances (e.g., neuroimaging), it will be critical to determine the amount of resources needed-in computational and storage resources, statistical and ontology-authoring support, and training for researchers to enter data and conduct analyses. With sufficient training, it may be possible to use "crowd-sourcing" techniques for much of this work, assuming a sufficient cadre of expert users is trained. In sum, Bilder et al. fully accomplish their implicit goal of convincing us that the mission is indeed possible, but like the rest of the RDoC program, a decade or more may be required to see it accomplished.
Conclusions
The three commentaries in this special section on the NIMH Research Domain Criteria project approach it from different perspectives. Berenbaum's article proceeds from a particular view about the nature of mental disorder, and what this implies about what is needed to develop a satisfactory system for classifying psychopathology. It then considers how greedy reductionism, biological fundamentalism, and rejection of subjectivism might render RDoC-inspired research diagnostically insufficient and insensitive to certain important clinical phenomena. Acknowledging difficulties in interpreting information issued in different NIMH publications, at different levels of scholarly formality, we observed that the RDoC approach does not depend on mind-brain identity claims and affords biology and psychology complementary roles in its aspiration to an integrative psychobiological understanding of mental illness. We also acknowledged Berenbaum's concern about prerequisite animal modeling of neural systems, and the attendant implication that potentially important research relying heavily on self-report data would indeed not conform to an idealized version of the RDoC template. We averred, however, that the RDoC template does not require animal models, and that pragmatic considerations would necessitate compromises to methodological purity in the area of self-reports. Overall, Berenbaum's critique reflects a careful reading of the NIMH materials describing the RDoC project, but, compared with our own understanding of the RDoC project, it overly attends RDoC's very deliberate elevation of neuroscience, at the expense of attention to RDoC's essential incorporation of psychology in the template for construct development and validation. Patrick et al.'s commentary describes a research approach to psychopathology which that group has been pursuing for some time, which predates and anticipates several features of the RDoC template: dimensional assessment, multilevel analyses, and explananda distinct from conventional DSM categories. Patrick et al.'s exemplary project overlaps substantially with the RDoC template and thus provides valuable lessons on the advantages and challenges of an RDoC approach. Bilder et al.'s article highlights the need for methods to represent, organize, and analyze complex multidimensional data, toward an innovative ontology of mental illness. Bilder's commentary casts in high relief important analytic challenges attendant to any RDoC approach, but that heretofore have not been engaged by the NIMH RDoC steering committee, either conceptually or in materials issued. Fortunately, Bilder et al.'s work offers much needed path finding in this area.
We conclude with two points. First, the articles in this special section testify to the importance of the role that clinical science in psychology plays with respect to the future of psychopathology, as particularly incorporated in the RDoC scheme. To date, diagnosis in mental disorders has been exclusively the province of symptom descriptions. Hence, in enhancing the role of neuroscience in assessment, it may appear that the aim is purely reductionistic. However, seen in a more balanced view, the goal of RDoC is to augment qualitatively described symptoms with more sophisticated measurement both in neuroscience and in psychometrics, in the service of a view of psychopathology based on psychological constructs. Second, the RDoC is a framework for research that relies for its progress upon engagement with the whole field. The intent of the NIMH is not to develop an instrument promulgated by a group of committees, but rather to foster a "crowd-sourcing" effort. In that regard, the articles in this special section represent a salient set of initial contributions toward that goal.
